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SAND OR OIL IN THE MACHINE?: A COMMENT ON CORRUPTION AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
 
 
 
... economists are now doing their political economy analysis explicitly, rather than implicitly 
as used to be the case. Most economists have now come to the realization that good economic 
advice requires an understanding of the political economy of the situation 
        Rodrik (1996: p. 38) 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Taslim (1994) argues that corruption in the form of bribe-taking is like sand in a machine 
rather than oil because it drives out firms with lower entrepreneurial skills from the market. 
Obviously, developing countries where entrepreneurial skills are in particular very scarce are 
adversely affected because there will be even fewer active entrepreneurs who can seek out 
“profitable opportunities… and directly add to the wealth of the nation in addition to 
enriching themselves" (Taslim 1994: p. 123). 
 
We agree and sympathise with the conclusions drawn by Taslim but disagree with his 
methodology which, as we will argue and demonstrate, is inappropriate for the nature of the 
problem addressed. Taslim's model is simple and elegant as good models should be. We are 
not concerned with particular simplifications he makes but with broader political economy 
assumptions in which the model is embedded. 
 
We make two points. First, Taslim's argument is critically based on his assumption of a 
particular benchmark against which the post-corruption situation is compared. The 
benchmark implicitly chosen is the neoclassical perfectly competitive market with well-
defined property rights and no transaction costs. The justification for using this as a 
2 
benchmark - and not just in developing countries alone - has been extensively questioned in 
the literature (Eggertsson 1990; North 1990; 1994; 1995; Samuels and Mercuro 1984) 
 
Taslim's case for rejecting the arguments of those who view corruption as oil in a 
machine (Baily 1966, Leff 1964, and Rashid 1981) is based on contesting their assumption of 
an already distorted and / or rent-seeking context as the benchmark. In Section II we show the 
importance of choosing the right benchmark. By identifying a distorted situation as the 
relevant benchmark, it is easy to modify Taslim's framework to show that corruption can 
increase entrepreneurship. This result is not a paradox of limited theoretical interest. It simply 
reestablishes the point made by Leff (1964) and more recently by Bhagwati (1982) among 
others that when initial situations are distorted, corruption (and more generally, rent-seeking) 
may be cost-reducing for the entrepreneurs engaging in it. The growing literature on the 
political economy of development (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990) suggests that the relevant 
benchmark for both successful and unsuccessful countries is that of a pre-existing situation 
which involves both distortion and rent-seeking. This brings us to our second point. If we 
have to abandon the neoclassical benchmark, is it possible to analyse the apparently 
differentiated effects of corruption across countries? This point is very briefly touched on in 
Section III and the reader is referred to the growing literature on the political economy of 
corruption.1 We draw on this literature to argue that the differential effects of corruption have 
to be explained not in terms of whether corruption is cost-reducing or cost-increasing for the 
individual entrepreneur but on the systemic effects of corruption in particular political and 
institutional contexts. 
 
It is not the case, as Taslim (1994: p. 119) suggests, that corruption has a universally 
negative effect which is not noticed in high growth economies but which is arithmetically 
debilitating in low growth economies. Rather theory and evidence are both beginning to 
recognise that in situations of pervasive distortion and rent-seeking, some forms of corruption 
(and rent seeking) can be efficiency-enhancing or at least neutral while others are starkly 
  
1
 See Khan (1996b) and other articles published in the Special Issue on Corruption in the IDS Bulletin, Vol. 
27, No. 2, April, 1996. 
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efficiency-reducing. The theoretical challenge is to be able to discriminate between different 
types of corruption and identify the causes of these differences (Khan 1996a ; 1996b). 
 
 
 
II. ALTERNATIVE BENCHMARKS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF POSITIVE 
EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION 
 
In this section we will discuss the problem of choosing a benchmark for determining the 
efficiency or entrepreneurial implications of corrupt transactions and to show why the 
benchmark of a perfectly competitive market may not be always appropriate. 
 
3.  New Allocation of Rights
2.  New Allocation of Rights
5.  New Allocation of Rights
4.  New Allocation of Rights
Intervention
Intervention
Corruption
Corruption
1.  Allocation of Rights
 
Figure 1 The Benchmark Problem 
 
The first box in figure 1 represents an allocation of rights in a perfectly competitive 
market.2 Government intervention (say by creating a new right like a tariff) brings about a 
new allocation of rights represented in box 2. At this stage, the associated corruption involved 
with rent-seeking may lead to yet another set of rights shown in box 3 and the process may go 
on.3 The move from box 2 to box 3 can be efficiency enhancing if rent-seeking expenditures 
shift the society from a less efficient position to a more efficient position by undoing some of 
the misallocations characterised by the set of rights in box 2 by re-channelling some or all of 
the misallocated resources to higher valued uses. Thus the welfare loss associated with box 3 
may be lower than the welfare loss associated with box 2 but higher than box 1. The problem 
  
2
 See Khan (1996b) for a detailed discussion of the benchmark problem in determining the efficiency 
implications of corruption. 
3
 Note that all rent-seeking activities are not necessarily corrupt. For example, where they exist, hiring a 
professional lobbying firm for rent-seeking purposes is perfectly legitimate. 
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is, if we start with any given allocation of rights, say from Box 5, what should be our 
benchmark for welfare or efficiency comparisons? Box 1? Box 2? Box 3 or Box 4? 
Neoclassical analysis evades this problem by considering box 1 as the benchmark for 
comparison and Taslim (1994) follows suit. We would argue that using such a benchmark 
may not be useful in analysing corrupt transactions, particularly in developing countries. 
 
New institutional economics has established the obvious point that well-defined property 
rights do not exist in a pristine form and all real-world contexts involve transaction costs, 
rent-seeking and political contests (Hariss et al. 1995; North 1990). In addition policy 
changes are generally political in nature or infected with inadequately processed information 
or determined by distributional conflicts and power asymmetries. Since a zero transaction 
cost world does not exist, the comparison of a real world corruption-induced distribution of 
rights with the distribution of rights in the zero transaction cost world is irrelevant. The 
relevant form of institutional analysis is a process analysis where the allocative and 
entrepreneurial effects of corruption are compared with a model of the actually pre-existing 
situation with positive transaction costs (Eggertsson 1990). 
 
To show the importance of the benchmark, we use Taslim's own model but alter the 
benchmark transaction cost assumptions. The initial situation is assumed to be distorted in the 
sense that there are positive transaction costs. This does not require us to assume, as Taslim 
(1994: p. 120) suggests, that human beings are innately corrupt. We do not need to make any 
normative assumptions about human nature. We only need to make a descriptive statement 
that the initial situation is distorted because of transaction costs. 
 
Consider a specific credit market transaction. Assume that there are lenders who are 
willing to lend at a nominal rate of interest r and that the supply of loanable funds is perfectly 
elastic at this interest rate. A horizontal supply curve of loanable funds can be assumed 
without loss of generality and serves to simplify our argument. In a world without transaction 
costs borrowers would pay the interest rate of r and the quantity demanded would be 
determined by the (downward-sloping) demand for loanable funds. Now assume that the 
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demand and supply for funds is matched through a set of savings-and-loan institutions. As is 
common in the institutional literature, we will assume that the costs of running this institution 
are borne by the transactors, namely borrowers and lenders. If we have a zero transaction cost 
world, the cost of the institutional transaction is zero and nothing changes by introducing the 
institution. Borrowers and lenders transact at the same interest rate r. If instead we have a 
positive transaction cost world, the outcome depends quite critically on the type of institution 
which is feasible. 
 
Suppose that in a positive transaction cost world the institution requires additional 
administrative and monitoring costs which amount to rm for transferring each unit of funds 
from lenders to borrowers. This has the effect of raising the supply price of funds by rm 
everywhere. The administrative and monitoring component rm is a transaction cost which can 
be of different magnitude given differences in the institutional and political context as well as 
with different policy imperatives of the government. For instance, rm may be positive if 
borrowers have to wait a long time before applications for loans are processed, or if they have 
to make legal but costly contributions to political parties or election campaign funds, or if the 
policy of the government is to encourage lending to particular sectors which in turn requires 
large monitoring costs by the institution which are passed on to the borrowers. Our 
assumption of a perfectly elastic supply of funds allows us to simplify the story because in 
this case the borrower simply faces a higher borrowing rate equal to r+rm 4. With reasonable 
assumptions about the institutional, political and policy imperatives of developing countries, 
rm could be very large.  
  
4
    In the case where the supply curve of loanable funds is upward sloping, our argument does not substantially 
change since the gap between the actual supply price of loanable funds and the notional supply price in a zero 
transaction cost world is always equal to rm. This is sufficient for our argument but complicates the 
exposition. A referee pointed out that some of the administrative and monitoring costs could be passed on to 
the rest of society through the tax system and need not be borne by the transactors. This is a perceptive point 
which goes to the heart of our dispute with Taslim. If the institution was such that an entrepreneur could not 
lower the private cost of funds by bribing then of course bribing would not take place except by coercion by 
the state. We are only asserting that in many realistic scenarios bribing can reduce the private cost of funds. 
On the other hand we are perfectly aware that efficient institutions do exist in many parts of the world where 
such incentives do not exist. Under those conditions the extraction of bribes will increase rather than decrease 
the private cost of funds to the borrower who then has an incentive to cooperate with the authorities to fight 
corruption. This is of course Taslim’s scenario and we are essentially arguing that this is not the general case. 
It is a particular case which is as special as the alternative possibility we are suggesting.  
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In the absence of far-reaching political and institutional changes, the entrepreneur’s 
response to this may be to by-pass some of these transaction costs by offering a bribe to key 
institutional agents within the financial institution. This too implies a cost for the 
entrepreneur, in the form of a bribe and the cost of organising the bribe. Suppose that this 
route increases the unit cost of funds by rb implying that the supply curve of loanable funds is 
everywhere raised by this amount. In the simple case with a perfectly elastic supply of funds, 
the entrepreneur now has access to funds at the rate r+rb. If rb < rm borrowers are clearly better 
off by bribing5. The institutional literature to which we have referred suggests that second-
best institutional arrangements can frequently be devised which are less costly for the 
participants to a transaction (in this case borrowers and lenders) in a positive transaction cost 
context.  
 
The key point is whether the relevant institutional benchmark for comparing the effects 
of corruption is the zero transaction cost one of neoclassical theory or the positive transaction 
cost one which we find in the real world. If it is the latter, we can clearly see the implications 
in figure 2 adapted from Taslim (1994: p. 130). The idealised neoclassical position is the one 
where the interest rate is r and there are no transaction costs. This corresponds to the 
equilibrium at point A in the diagram where entrepreneurs with skills equal to or higher than 
e0 survive in the market. The real world situation with positive transaction costs results in 
real costs of borrowing to the amount of r + rm. Equilibrium in this situation is shown by 
point B. Given this level of real cost of borrowing, only entrepreneurs with skills equal to or 
higher than e (r + rm) can participate in the market. The alternative case of corruption is 
shown by the situation where the post-bribe effective interest rate is r + rb. With this effective 
rate of interest, equilibrium is at point C and only those entrepreneurs having entrepreneurial 
skills equal to or higher than e (r + rb) can remain in the market. 
 
  
5
    Even if the supply curve of funds is upward sloping borrowers will always be able to lower their cost of 
borrowing by bribing as long as rb < rm which is sufficient for our argument but in this case the cost of funds 
for borrowers in each situation will depend on the elasticities of supply and demand of funds. 
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Figure 2 A case of positive relationship between corruption and entrepreneurship 
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As long as the loan demand function is downward sloping with respect to the effective 
cost of borrowing, we have 
 
e (r + rm) > e (r + rb) > e0  as long as (r+rm) > (r+rb)  > r. 
 
 
Thus the entrepreneurial skill required to remain in the market in the post-bribe situation, 
e (r + rb), is higher if the benchmark is the zero transaction cost benchmark, e0 , but lower if 
the benchmark is the actually existing world with positive transaction cost, e (r + rm) for a 
range of realistic institutional cases where rm > rb > 0. 
 
 
III. THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION 
 
To suggest that the effects of corruption can depend on the prevailing political and 
institutional framework does not mean that the effects of corruption are always beneficial 
(Ades and Tella 1996; Harriss-White and White 1996; Kong 1996; Mauro 1995). There is 
now a considerable body of research which has tried to identify why the effects of corruption 
may vary across countries. Some of this literature is reviewed in Khan (1996a; 1996b). In the 
opinion of the authors and Harriss-White and White (1996), greater analytical precision in the 
analysis of the effects of corruption depends on locating corruption in the precise political and 
institutional context in which it appears. In fact we agree with Taslim that corruption is 
associated with damaging economic effects in Bangladesh. However, this is probably not 
because of the mechanism he suggests which ignores transaction costs and the benchmark 
problem. Corruption has a negative effect in Bangladesh which is much more marked than in 
countries such as South Korea or Indonesia despite the fact that in all these countries 
corruption is individually rational for entrepreneurs given existing institutions. The systemic 
differences are in the institutional and political context which makes corruption growth-
retarding in countries like Bangladesh but not in South Korea. One of the authors has 
elsewhere argued that the answer may have to do with the balance of power between the state 
and its clients which leads to corrupt transactions in weak states having systemic efficiency-
reducing effects (Khan 1996b). Clearly our understanding of the efficiency and 
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entrepreneurial effects of corruption has a long way to go but fruitful research requires that 
we locate economic analysis in the context of stylised political and institutional models. 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of our comment has been to argue that zero transaction cost models which 
abstract from pre-existing politics and institutions have a limited explanatory scope rather 
than to show that corruption is beneficial for any country. We have argued that the problem of 
choosing a benchmark for welfare and entrepreneurial comparisons is an important one. By 
introducing positive transaction costs in Taslim's model we have shown that corruption can 
be privately beneficial in some institutional contexts. In the framework suggested by Taslim, 
corruption can aid entrepreneurship in such contexts. In contrast the systemic effects of 
corruption can depend on other factors including the political and institutional context. These 
observations have policy relevance. If corruption and its harmful effects have to be targeted, 
policy has to distinguish between the institutional features which make corruption 
individually rational in developing countries and the institutional and political features which 
determine whether its effects are beneficial, benign or malignant in that particular context. 
Developing countries have not really been substantially different in terms of the incentives 
created for privately profitable corruption whether we look at South Korea or Bangladesh. In 
all these cases, the perspective suggested by Taslim could lead us to conclude that corruption 
actually increased entrepreneurship since entrepreneurs have often sought out corrupt 
transactions as cost-reducing strategies. However, developing countries have differed quite 
substantially in their broader institutional and political frameworks which can explain the 
differential economic effects of their corruption. We would look there for explanations of 
differential performance. 
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